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Abstract 
The discourse about equipment financing (financial leasing) business is not as to 
whether it is useful; but it is about how to create the best possible investment 
climate for the growth and expansion of the sector; that is how to maximize the 
economic gains in terms of facilitating alternative access to financing for 
businesses. Equipment financing or financial leasing is one of the alternative 
mechanisms of solving financing needs of businesses and individuals. It combines 
the attributes of lending and leasing, hence the name finance leasing or lease 
financing. It involves lending equipment (instead of lending the funds needed to 
purchase it) with the possibility of eventual ownership of the equipment by the 
borrower. Although equipment financing and leasing existed in Ethiopia over a 
long period of time, a detailed law on the subject was introduced only recently. 
However, the new regulatory regime which placed the financial leasing sector 
under the regulation of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) did not stimulate the 
emergence of financial leasing companies as intended. It brought about the 
creation of big government owned leasing companies whose formation and 
operation is rather politically driven than supported by economic rationales. Much 
of the reason for the lack of enthusiasm from the private sector seems to be the 
discouraging regulatory environment. Therefore, the complex and cumbersome 
regulatory framework should be simplified if financial leasing companies are to 
flourish and play a meaningful role as alternative sources of financing.  
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Introduction 
Capital goods financing business (CGFB)1, also commonly known as equipment 
financing business, is a type of business that finances acquisition of equipment 
for businesses in a contractual arrangement whereby the financier (lessor) 
supplies the equipment required by the customer (lessee), and the latter pays 
rent plus interest for the duration of the period of the lease with eventual or 
possible transfer of ownership of the equipment to the lessee at the end of the 
lease.2 The types of businesses served by equipment financing sector are often 
start-ups, micro, small and medium level enterprises that cannot get financing 
from banks3 due to, among other factors, their inability to produce collateral.4 
                                           
Frequently used acronyms: 
Capital Goods Financing Business (CGFB) 
Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE) 
Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) 
National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) 
Non-banking Financial Institutions (NBFI) 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
1
 Capital Goods Leasing Business Proclamation No. 103/1998, Federal Negarit Gazeta 4
th
 
Year No. 27, 1998 introduced the modern form of equipment financing into Ethiopia; and 
Capital Goods Leasing Business (Amendment) Proclamation No. 807/2013, Federal 
Negarit Gazeta 19
th
  Year No. 60, 2013  has amended the earlier proclamation, Both 
proclamations use the term „„Capital Goods Leasing Business-CGLB.‟‟ This is because the 
proclamations cover operating leases.  On the other hand the National Bank uses the term 
„„Capital Goods Financing Business-CGFB‟‟ in all of the directives it issued so far 
probably with the view to make the terminology more fitting to its overarching mandate of 
regulating the financial sector. The terminology of NBE is appropriate because, NBE is 
not concerned with operating leases which are regulated by the Ministry of Trade (MOT). 
In reality various other terminologies are used in different literatures. To mention just a 
few, Equipment Financing, Asset Financing, Lease Financing, Financial Leasing, and so 
on. In this paper the writer uses the term „„Equipment Financing‟‟ and „„Financial 
Leasing‟‟ alternatively as these are the terms widely used in literature, and for their 
simplicity as well.     
2
 Deloitte, „Banking and Financial Services: Finance Leasing‟ Deloitte Limited, 2017p. 3, 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cy/Documents/financial-
services/CY_FinancialServices_FinancialLeasing_Noexp.pdf> accessed on 1 August 2019 
3
 Asress Adimi Gikay (2017), „Rethinking Ethiopian Secured Transactions Law through 
Comparative Perspective: Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code of the US‟, Mizan 
Law Review 11 no.1:169. 
4
 See, National Bank of Ethiopia, „Capital Goods Finance Companies in Ethiopia: An 
Overview‟ Birritu Magazine 118 (2014), p. 32 for the assertion that equipment financing 
scheme simplifies the collateral related problems of SMEs. See also Economisti Associati 
and BKP Development, „Access to Finance in Ethiopia: Policy, Regulatory and 
Administrative Remedies‟, WBG/IFC, p. 24, 33, 35 (2014). According to this survey 
problems associated with collateral were found to be the second most pressing challenge 
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Because the equipment supplied through leasing serves the function of 
collateral5, those businesses that cannot get credit from banks for lack of 
collateral can be served by financial leasing companies. 
The first section of this article highlights the features and indicators in the 
regulation of equipment financing.  Section 2 deals with the conceptual and 
theoretical underpinnings of the regulation of equipment leasing in Ethiopia, 
namely, the broader historical and theoretical literature on the evolution, types 
of financial leasing companies and regulatory approaches for equipment 
financing businesses. It compares financial sector firms especially banks and 
equipment leasing firms with the view to assessing the regulatory regime for the 
latter by contrasting it with the regime for banks. In Section 3, an evaluation of 
the regulatory system of financial leasing sector is made based on five indicators 
and building upon the theoretical and conceptual analysis.  
1. Regulation of Equipment Financing and Core Indicators of 
Regulatory Effectiveness 
Financial leasing is one of the alternative mechanisms of solving financing 
needs of businesses and individuals along with bank loans. Essentially it is an 
activity of lending equipment instead of lending the funds needed to purchase it 
with the possibility of eventual ownership of it by the borrower. In spite of these 
parallels between financial leasing and bank lending, the business of financial 
leasing is not the same as that of lending. Thus, the regulatory design for leasing 
cannot be a replica of the banking regulatory architecture.   
In Ethiopia, equipment financing businesses are part of non-banking 
financial institutions (NBFI) which is subject to NBE regulation. NBFI are 
financial companies engaged in economic activities akin to banking –“but are 
not classified as deposit takers.”6 Under Ethiopian law, the place of Micro-
Finance Institutions (MFIs) is equivocal from this perspective if one strictly 
applies this definition. They are deposit takers, and hence technically outside the 
scope of NBFIs; on the other hand MFIs are not banks, and thus functionally 
can be considered to be NBFIs. In any case, it is generally assumed that the 
regulation of NBFIs should be less cumbersome than the regulation of banks. 
The regulation of these institutions is usually, but not always, vested in 
                                                                                                            
next to inadequacy of loan size. The problems in relation to collateral are basically two: (i) 
very limited types of assets are accepted as collateral; and (ii) overcollateralization, i.e., 
when accepted, the value of the collateral is required to be substantially more than the 
amount of the loan requested.  
5
 Asres Adimi, supra note 3, p. 181. 
6
 IBRD/IMF (2005), Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook, p. 171.  
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institutions that regulate the banking sector. However, the nature and purpose of 
their regulation often varies from the nature and purpose for which banks are 
regulated.  
Although the financial sector is regulated for a variety of purposes, the 
regulatory objective that distinguishes financial sector regulation from other 
business regulations is generally prudential regulation which aims at protecting 
the financial sector from systemic risks. In order to effectively meet its desired 
objectives, financial sector regulation should (i) be developed on clear legal 
basis; (ii) be proportionate in terms of the risks it aims to avert and the barriers it 
places in the way of doing business; (iii) encourage true competition; and (iv) it 
should be based on fairness and equity. This in turn requires an understanding of 
the nature of the various financial sector actors, and the extent to which each of 
these actors pose systemic risks to the financial sector and the economy as a 
whole. Duplication of regulatory standards designed for the banking sector (that 
poses greater systemic risks) for the non-banking sector may discourage 
potential entrants and drive out existing ones thereby threatening the existence 
of NBFI sectors.   
Equipment financing business which was an unregulated sector two decades 
before has been placed under tight NBE regulation which seems to be modeled 
from the banking regulation. Based on its mandate under Proclamation No.  
807/2013, the NBE has enacted several directives on regulation of the business 
of financial leasing. An examination of the Proclamation and the directives 
issued by the NBE triggers several questions, inter alia, the characterization of 
equipment leasing business, the nature and propriety of the current regulation by 
the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), and the distinction between financial 
leasing companies and other financial companies from the regulatory 
perspective. This article deals with these issues and outlines the regulatory 
challenges in the regulation of financial leasing sector in Ethiopia with the view 
to underlining the need for reform. 
This research involves analysis of legislation, directives, manuals, forms, 
model documents and letters issued by the NBE in relation to equipment 
financing. There are seven major directives stated in Section 3.1 that the NBE 
has enacted in implementing its regulatory mandate. This article examines these 
seven directives in light of basic principles of regulatory quality. In addition to 
these directives which are the fundamental instruments of NBE regulation, the 
article also examines the Capital Goods Lease Business Proclamation No. 
807/2013 and other manuals, letters and guidelines issued by the NBE in 
relation to the sector.    
Examining the effectiveness of a regulatory system is inquiring into the 
regulatory framework, its fairness, its impacts both positive and negative and its 
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internal and external consistency with established economic and political 
values.7 Evaluating regulatory effectiveness is more often done ex ante before 
enactment of the regulation by way of consultations and regulatory impact 
analysis (RIA). Ex post evaluation is less developed than ex ante evaluation 
which uses sophisticated tools of regulatory impact analysis (RIA). In this 
regard various authorities indicate that experiences vary considerably from 
country to country and from industry to industry even within a country.8 In 
terms of methodology, even most OECD countries are „yet to establish a 
sophisticated methodology and quality control of ex post evaluations of 
regulations.‟9 Therefore, in the absence of standardized methodology and 
indicators for ex post review of regulations, this author has adapted qualitative 
indicators for this inquiry from OECD‟s eight indicators of regulatory 
performance and regulatory policy evaluation.10 
Ex ante cost-effectiveness and net benefit efficiency indicators as well as ex 
post economic indicators are excluded from this analysis. Cost efficiency 
evaluation in terms of compliance cost for businesses and administrative cost for 
the regulator could not be done, because the regulations have not been fully 
implemented for lack of an empowered private sector. This article therefore uses 
the following five principle-based indicators:  
a) Process/procedural legitimacy- this looks at the procedure followed in 
enacting the directives 
b) Internal consistency- this looks at consistency of the directives, i.e.,  the 
extent of congruence between the enabling proclamations and the 
directives  
c) Consistency with other values – the scope and nature of the directives 
vis-à-vis the other values mainly competition and consumer protection 
principles  
d) Equity/Distributional fairness/substantive validity/– this looks at the 
content of the directives and the regulatory burden imposed on the 
regulated sector 
e) Outcome and impact effectiveness – this looks at the extent to which the 
regulation produced the intended results in terms of intermediate 
outcomes.  
                                           
7
 Cary Coglianese (2012), Measuring Regulatory Performance: Evaluating the Impact of 
Regulations and Regulatory Policy, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), Expert Paper No. 1, August 2012, p. 8. 
8
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,  Regulatory Policy Outlook 
(OECD, 2015), p. 129.  
9
 Id., 128. 
10
 Coglianese, supra note 7, pp. 18, 34. 
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These principles-based parameters can fairly reflect the quality of the 
regulation of equipment financing sector in Ethiopia. Nevertheless there still 
remains some degree of incompleteness since an analysis of administrative cost 
and compliance cost are not included. This requires solid empirical data which 
in turn require a robust equipment financing business in the country. I argue 
that, a robust equipment financing sector cannot come into existence unless the 
current regulatory framework is improved. In spite of the absence of cost-benefit 
analysis, the findings of this article can contribute as an input for policy making 
and further research in the field. This research does not address operating leases 
regulated by the Ministry of Trade. 
2. Theoretical Underpinnings of Financial Leasing Regulation in 
Ethiopia 
2.1. Leasing versus bank loan 
Financial leasing is one of the alternative mechanisms of solving financing 
needs of businesses and individuals. It combines the attributes of lending and 
leasing, hence the name financial leasing or lease financing. But in simpler 
terms it can be taken to mean lending equipment instead of lending the funds 
needed to purchase it with the possibility of eventual ownership of it by the 
borrower. In spite of these parallels between financial leasing and bank lending, 
there are notable differences. Although the equipment leased in financial leasing 
serves an equivalent purpose with collateral in bank lending, it is owned by the 
lessor, not by the lessee. This stands in marked contrast with collateral which is 
owned by the borrower. Hence, unlike banks that have to go through 
bureaucratic foreclosure procedures11 when the borrower defaults, lessors can 
simply take back the leased equipment without much difficulty in case of lessee 
default.12 On the other hand, while banks have to charge interest on their loans, 
lessors are not necessarily required to charge interest, as they can simply charge 
the installment payments with premiums added on as service charge.  
                                           
11
 The old judicial foreclosure pursuant to the Civil Procedure Code has been replaced by 
power of sale foreclosure by virtue of the Foreclosure Proclamation, i.e., Proclamation to 
Provide for Property Mortgaged or Pledged with Banks, Proclamation No. 97/1998, 
Federal Negarit Gazeta, No.16, 19th, February 1998. While the Proclamation eliminates 
the requirement of judicial oversight of the foreclosure, it does not completely rule out the 
applicability of the Civil Procedure Code provisions to regulate the auction process to be 
run by the lender- See Article 6. The same applies with business mortgage, See Business 
Mortgage Proclamation No.98/1998, Federal Negarit Gazeta, No.16, 19th, February 1998, 
Article 16. 
12
 See Article 6(2) of Capital Goods Leasing Business Proclamation No. 103/1998 which 
authorizes the lessor to simply take back the asset leased upon giving 30 days‟ notice. 
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The similarity of leasing and borrowing is even more manifest from the 
demand side. In financial economics, lease and debt are so similar that they are 
assumed by some writers to be substitutes.13 The more a firm leases, the lesser it 
borrows or vice versa. Firms, especially Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
evaluate buying equipment through borrowing funds with lease financing of the 
same equipment. „When a firm buys an asset, it obtains both the right to the 
services of that asset over the period it is owned plus the right to sell the asset at 
any future date. With a lease, the firm acquires only the right to the asset‟s 
services for a period specified in the contract‟ with the possibility of owning it at 
the end.14 However, purchasing equipment requires huge upfront investment in 
contrast to leasing which can enable a firm to acquire an asset by investing a 
fraction of its value upfront. That is the main reason why financial leasing is 
associated with SMEs, startups and other small enterprises. 
Lease financing is thus meant to enable hundreds of thousands of youth with 
skills and good project ideas, small businesses and SMEs that cannot afford to 
borrow from banks to acquire capital assets. The potential benefits to the overall 
economy from the well-functioning leasing business is huge that lease financing 
constitutes an important part of financing in many other countries. 
2.2 The Evolution of the Law of Equipment Lease Financing in Ethiopia 
The history of lease financing can be traced back to a very distant past. 
According to one account, „„leasing of equipment has been in practice since the 
ancient times in the Sumerian City of Ur, about 2010 BC which was then a 
major commercial center. It involved the rental of farm tools leased to farmers 
by priests who then stood as government authorities.‟‟15 Moreover, 
Hammurabi‟s Code (1750 BC), “acknowledged the existence of lease of 
movable property.‟‟16 Ethiopia‟s experience with leasing also goes some 
centuries back. For instance, the relationship between lessor and lessee was 
regulated by the Fetha Nagast, which was in force since the mid-15th century.17 
The 1960 Civil Code has introduced modern leasing to Ethiopia. The Civil 
Code set out a fairly modernized legal platform for the exercise of equipment 
                                           
13
 James Ang and Pamela P. Peterson (1984), „The Leasing Puzzle,‟ The Journal of Finance, 
39, pp. 1055-1065. 
14
 Clifford W. Smith and Macdonald Wakeman (1985), „Determinants of Corporate Leasing 
Policy,‟ The Journal of Finance, 40 no 3, pp. 895-908. 
15
 Iyare Otabor-Olubor (2017), The Next Frontiers for Finance Leasing in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Revisiting Secured Transaction Law in Nigeria, (Vienna, UNCTAD), p. 4.  
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Peter L. Strauss, ed. (1968), The Fetha Nagast: The Law of Kings, Translated from Ge’ez 
by Aba Paulos TzAdua, (Addis Ababa: HSIU Faculty of Law) 199-206 ; Civil Code of the 
Empire of Ethiopia, Negarit Gazzeta Special Edition (1960). 
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financing business with varieties of types of contracts.  These include sale with 
ownership reserved (Articles 2387-2389), sale with right of redemption (Article 
2390-2393), Hiring sale/ hire purchase/ (Articles 2412-2415) and letting and 
hiring (Articles 2727-2738).18According to Article 2387(1) sale with ownership 
reserved is a contract whereby possession of a thing is transferred to a buyer 
with the ownership reserved with the seller until price is paid. Risk is transferred 
to buyer upon delivery. On the other hand, sale with right of redemption is an 
arrangement of financing in which a seller reserves the right to redeem the thing 
sold within a maximum of two years from date of sale.19  
A hire-purchase contract in the Civil Code is more of an installment sale. 
However, this provision does not explicitly provide the most important features 
of a hire-purchase contract which is the joint ownership of the equipment during 
the term of the contract. In hire-purchase, the important feature is that with each 
payment of the instalment, an equal percentage of ownership of the asset is 
transferred to the buyer implying that from beginning to end of the payment, the 
thing is jointly owned by the seller and buyer.20 Letting and hiring refers to the 
contract commonly known as operating lease in modern parlance. Operating 
lease is defined under Article 2(5) of Proclamation No. 103/1998 as an 
agreement in which a person lets another to use his equipment in return for a 
payment for a maximum period of two years. There is no issue of transfer of 
ownership in an operating lease unlike in a financial lease or hire-purchase.  
All these contracts have elements of easing financial burden of acquiring an 
asset needed by a business or a consumer. However, the Civil Code does not 
have the more modern types of contracts such as lease financing and sale and 
lease back transactions. On the other hand, all these provisions in the Civil Code 
with the exception of those on letting and hiring were very scanty, and were thus 
inadequate to define the nature of the contracts, and the respective rights and 
obligations of parties to these contracts. This seems to have contributed 
negatively towards the development of the equipment financing industry in 
Ethiopia.  
Financial leasing is essentially a capital intensive investment as opposed to 
operating leases. This is because an investor can buy equipment and run an 
operating lease business with that equipment. In contrast, such an enterprise 
makes little business sense in financial leasing as the lease being for long 
duration (often for the full economic life of the equipment), the leasing business 
will be practically idle except for collecting rents by just leasing the sole 
                                           
18
 An interesting discussion on the relationship of these types of contracts from the 
perspective of secured transactions law is made by Asres Adimi, „Rethinking Ethiopian 
Secured Transactions Law,‟ supra note 3, 181-182. 
19
  Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Articles 2390-2391. 
20
  See Article 2(4) of Capital Goods Leasing Business Proclamation No. 103/1998. 
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equipment. This explains the reason why there are so many operating lease 
businesses, but practically no financial leasing ones with the exception of those 
created by the government.21 
A separate proclamation was enacted to facilitate lease financing as an 
alternative to traditional financing mechanisms with the view to support growth 
of the Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE) sector in 1998. The enactment of the 
Capital Goods Leasing Business Proclamation No. 103/199822 has a similar 
rationale. The Proclamation clearly outlined the three conventional types of 
lease contract models, namely operational lease, finance lease and hire-purchase 
contracts. Article 2(3) defines financial lease as a type of leasing by which a 
lessor provides a lessee against payment of mutually agreed instalments over a 
specified period with the use of specified capital goods. The Proclamation goes 
further in explaining the leased assets as: (a) either already acquired by the 
lessor; or (b) purchased by the lessor from a third party, known as the supplier, 
chosen and specified by the lessee.  
Under a contract of financial lease, the lessor retains full ownership right on 
the capital goods during the period of the lease agreement, and, subject to 
agreement between the two parties, the lessee may have an option to purchase 
the capital good outright after the termination of the lease period at an agreed 
price. On the other hand, hire-purchase is defined as a contract by which a lessor 
provides a lessee with the use of specified capital goods, against payment of 
mutually agreed instalments over a specified period, under which, with each 
lease payment, an equal percentage of the ownership is transferred to the lessee 
and, upon effecting of the last payment, the ownership of the capital goods is 
automatically transferred to the lessee.  
The basic difference between the two types of contracts is apparent: in lease 
finance, the ownership of the leased asset remains with the lessor, whereas in 
hire-purchase, ownership is progressively transferred to the lessee from the 
lessor in proportion to the instalments paid. Hence, while in hire-purchase 
                                           
21
 The motivation behind the establishment of these so-called five big regional state owned 
CGFB companies was purely political. And, as such most of them have not yet been 
successful from the business perspective. See generally Robert Homans (2018), Turnkey 
Projects’ Current Status Assessment, 9. 
22
 See the Preamble of Capital Goods Leasing Business Proclamation No. 103/1998. The 
preamble reads as follows: “Whereas, for those investors who have the desire, knowledge 
and profession to participate in various investment activities but could not act due to lack 
of capital, it is necessary to create an enabling environment for the establishment of an 
alternative source of financing; Whereas, it is believed that lessors of capital goods can fill 
the existing gap which is not addressed by the existing financial institutions; Whereas, the 
existing laws concerning capital goods leasing business are found incomplete …” 
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payment of the last instalment signals transfer of ownership, the same cannot be 
said with regard to lease-finance unless specifically agreed between the lessor 
and lessee. In contrast, operational lease is a short term lease. It is less of a 
financing instrument than the two because it does not in any way lead to the 
eventual transfer of ownership of the leased asset to the lessee.  
However, the introduction of financial leasing through Proclamation No. 
103/1998 did not stimulate the equipment financing sector as intended. During 
the fifteen years after its enactment, it did not enable the emergence a single 
equipment financing company. This led to the enactment of the Capital Goods 
Leasing Business (Amendment) Proclamation No. 807/2013. As if lack of 
regulatory supervision was the cause for disinterest of the private sector in 
equipment financing, the amendment placed the sector under the regulation of 
the National Bank of Ethiopia. Hence, the amended proclamation introduced a 
clear institutional separation between financial leasing and operational leasing in 
that, while the former was placed under the regulatory supervision of the NBE, 
the later remained within the general licensing requirement of Ministry of Trade. 
Secondly, the Proclamation also introduced portfolio separation in such a 
way that financial leasing company cannot do operational lease and vice versa. 
In effect the same company cannot do operational and equipment leasing 
business simultaneously. The amendment has also introduced important reforms 
such as registration requirement for equipment finance agreements23, and 
exemption of VAT on payments made to the lessor under such contracts.    
In spite of these changes, no independent leasing company or captive leasing 
company (as defined under Section 2.3 below) has emerged during the last five 
years from the private sector partly due to the high equity capital requirement 
and other technical entry barriers. This led to the elimination of the ban on 
foreign investors from the sector which in turn brought some interest from 
foreign firms. Nevertheless the excessive regulatory requirements seem to 
hamper the private sector‟s enthusiasm.24 On the other hand, the Addis Ababa 
City Administration and the four big regional state governments have each 
                                           
23
 The Council of Ministers has afterwards issued Registration and Supervision of Capital 
Goods and Capital Goods Leasing Agreements Council of Ministers‟ Regulation No. 
309/2017, Negarit Gazeta, 20
th
 Year, No. 40, July 2014 on registration of Lease Finance 
Agreements. This regulation is aimed to resolve the hitherto problem emanating from 
absence of registration of assets submitted as collateral. With such registration, the 
problem of establishing validity and seniority of security claims is expected to be 
streamlined.  
24
 As of August 2019 the first private sector financial leasing company has been licensed. 
See Kaleyesus Bekele, „Capital Lease Company Opens Shop‟ The Reporter, August 10, 
2019<https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/capital-lease-finance-company-opens-
shop> 
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established equipment finance companies.25 Microfinance institutions are also 
authorized to provide a similar service.26 With the inclusion of Development 
Bank of Ethiopia that gives equipment lease financing for the value between 
Birr 1 million to 30 million, the equipment leasing landscape is currently 
heavily dominated by the public sector.  
2.3 Types of equipment financing businesses 
Generally, equipment financing business can be operated by three types of 
companies which are often referred to as banks, captives, and independents. 
Banks when allowed to operate equipment financing business do leasing activity 
primarily to collect interest payment from the lessees in addition to the value of 
the equipment. Captive leasing companies, i.e., companies which are 
subsidiaries of equipment manufacturers, do leasing business in order to boost 
sales of their parent company by offering to customers easy payment solutions. 
On the other hand, independents are companies affiliated to neither banks nor 
equipment manufacturers.  
2.3.1 Banks or bank subsidiaries  
In many countries banks provide equipment leasing as one of their financial 
products. By using the huge funds under their custody, banks can have lesser 
cost in acquiring the equipment needed for leasing. According to Kieso D. et al, 
relying on their competitive advantage, banks in the USA have entered the 
equipment leasing market aggressively in response to the increasing demand 
from the market. As a result, some big banks like Credit Suisse, Chase, Barclays 
and Duetsche Bank have sizable leasing subsidiaries.27 
This is in spite of the implementation of Basel II and III accords which 
together aim to discourage banks from engaging in leasing, as the associated 
“assets” are heavily discounted for the purpose of the various capitalization 
ratios, i.e. leasing comes with a relatively high cost of capital for banks. The 
Basel accords have thus made most banks to shift their equipment financing 
businesses to subsidiaries or transferred them to independents in exchange for 
small equity. And when banks have an equity interest in these companies, it is 
considered a „non-banking‟ equity interest; but since such leasing companies 
tend to be very thinly capitalized, the impact on the bank‟s equity ratio is 
insignificant.28 However, in spite of the continued tightening of regulation in the 
                                           
25
  Robert Homans, supra note 21.   
26
 Capital Goods Leasing Business (Amendment) Proclamation No. 807/2013, Article 4(2) 
27
 Kieso D. et al, (2011), Intermediate Accounting Vol. II, (United States of America: John 
Wiley and Sons), 1121. 
28
 Equipment Leasing & Finance Foundation (2006), Rise of the Banks in Equipment 
Finance: Establishing a Sustainable Engine for Growth, p. 43. 
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banking sector which was expected to discourage banks from direct involvement 
of banks in equipment leasing sector, the leasing market in the USA is still 
heavily dominated by banks.29 
2.3.2 Captive companies 
A captive finance company is an entity whose primary mission is to provide 
financial products that promote and facilitate the sale or lease of products 
manufactured by its parent company.30 Captive equipment leasing companies 
often operate as subsidiaries of equipment manufacturers. Some of the well-
known captive financial leasing companies include Caterpillar Financial Services 
Corporation, Ford Motor Credit Company, Boeing Capital Corporation, Deere 
& Company, Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation, American Honda Finance 
Corporation, Toyota Financial Services, and Volvo Financial Services. 
Although direct sale remains the most reliable marketing mechanism, using a 
leasing subsidiary is becoming increasingly a common practice. Compared to 
banks/bank affiliates and independents, captives have the advantage of product 
knowledge and easier and more predictable supply.31 In terms of effectiveness 
“though captives sometimes generate profit from a financial services 
perspective, their primary objective is to generate profit for the parent by 
increasing equipment sales.”32 The lack of flexibility to offer alternative 
products (other than that of the parent) to consumers is the downside to growth 
and expansion of captives.  
2.3.3 Independent companies 
Independent lessors are sometimes called third party vendors. Because they lack 
the low cost funds like banks or the access to equipment and related product 
knowledge that captives possess, independents are presumed to be disadvantaged 
from the competitive point of view.33 The difference is clear; “banks have access 
to low cost deposits from which to provide funding. Captives usually have 
access to efficient parent company treasury operations that offer modestly priced 
                                           
29
 Kieso D. et al, supra note 27, 1121. 
30
 Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Bank for International 
Settlements, „Re: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Board of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions Second Consultative Document Regarding 
Margin Requirements for Non-Centrally Cleared Derivatives‟ 
<https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/403/pdf/Captive%20Finance%20Companies.pdf> 
(accessed on August 10 2019). 
31
 Ibid.  
32
 Macquerie Equipment Finance, Reasons to Choose an Independent Lessor, 
<http://static.macquarie.com/dafiles/Internet/mgl/com/mef/pdf/wp-reasons-to-choose-an-
independent-lessor.pdf> (Accessed July 10, 2018). 
33
 Ibid.  
 Sense and Nonsense in the Regulation of Equipment Financing Business in Ethiopia                        43 
 
 
debt.”34 However, this does not necessarily mean that independents cannot 
compete with banks and captives. As they can offer varieties of products as 
opposed to captives, they meet customer choices much better than captives. The 
comparatively cumbersome regulatory environment under which banks or bank 
affiliates operate means that independents can have some advantage against 
banks or their subsidiaries.35 
Independents are also found to be more innovative than banks or captives in 
meeting niche market demands. As one survey conducted on the American 
equipment financing market found out, “independents can apply expertise to a 
niche focus, they can market where the banks can‟t operate or where they can‟t 
operate effectively, and they can often adapt more quickly than a bank-owned 
company.”36 In the IT equipment market, for instance, independent lessors have 
succeeded by reselling used equipment in the secondary market at the same time 
giving customers attractive pricing, terms, and service options on the 
refurbished equipment –with the customer being the beneficiary. In contrast, 
“equipment manufacturers (through their captive finance company) tend to steer 
customers toward their „latest and greatest‟ (often a euphemism for „most 
expensive‟) new models.”37 
2.4 Types of financial regulation applicable to the financial leasing Sector 
Generally, financial sector institutions are subject to two broad categories of 
regulatory supervision. These are commonly known as prudential and non-
prudential regulations. Prudential regulation in its turn can be bifurcated into 
micro-prudential and macro-prudential approaches. Non-prudential regulations 
include conduct of business regulations, competition regulation, and consumer 
protection regulation and so on. In this sub-section, an overview of these major 
types of regulatory activities will be made in the light of financial leasing sector. 
Determining the appropriate mix of regulation for various financial sector 
institutions has always been an intricate task for regulatory authorities. This is 
because, “while both competition regulation and conduct of business regulation 
(including market integrity) apply to all sectors and institutions in the financial 
system, assessing which type of NBFIs warrant prudential regulation is, in 
practice, a difficult exercise.”38 Since clarity of these regulatory categories and 
their respective objectives is crucial for developing the appropriate regulatory 
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framework for equipment financing sector, a more elaborate discussion on each 
type of regulation is necessary.  
2.4.1 Prudential regulation 
According to Carmichael and Pomerleano, prudential regulation is a form of 
regulation that involves counteracting asymmetric information problems in 
financial markets. Information asymmetry is said to arise “where products or 
services are sufficiently complex that other forms of regulation are 
insufficient.”39  In the banking sector, the purpose of prudential regulation is 
thus “to minimize information asymmetry problems faced by the large number 
depositors in monitoring the use of their deposits.”40 However, this seems rather 
a narrower conception of prudential regulation, because prudential regulation 
has much more than the dampening problems emanating from information 
asymmetry in the financial market.  
The broader objective of prudential regulation of the financial sector is 
maintaining a healthy and stable financial sector. Because, the financial sector 
(specially the banking sector) of an economy plays a vital role by “facilitating 
payments, providing liquidity, pooling savings and risk-sharing, and credit 
intermediation between savers and investors”,41 instability of the sector can 
breed instability into the overall economy. Stricter prudential regulation is thus 
required for banks. Such strict prudential regulations often impose regulatory 
requirements on minimum capital, capital adequacy, liquidity, large exposures, 
loan-loss provisions, risk management, governance, reporting, and so on.42 
Protecting the financial sector from crisis that can actually or potentially 
result in systemic risk is the basic purpose of prudential regulation.43 In the 
context of banking business, a systemic risk is defined as “the risk of a sudden, 
unanticipated event that would damage the financial system to such an extent 
that the economic activity in the wider economy would suffer. Such shocks may 
originate inside or outside the financial sector.”44 Examples of causes of such 
crisis may include the unexpected failure of a major player in the market, a 
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sudden breakdown in key technological infrastructure at a critical stage of 
settlements or payments systems, or a political upheaval such as an invasion or 
imposition of exchange control in a key financial center, and so on.45 
Two alternative approaches are followed in implementing prudential 
regulation: these are micro-prudential regulation and macro-prudential 
regulation. Markus Brunnermeier et al explain the meaning and distinction 
between the two approaches:  
“Micro-prudential regulation concerns itself with the stability of each 
individual institution. Macro-prudential regulation concerns itself with the 
stability of the financial system as a whole. Micro-prudential regulation 
examines the responses of an individual bank to exogenous risks. By 
construction it does not incorporate endogenous risk.”46 
In other words, micro-prudential regulation “focuses on the health of 
individual institutions, essentially assuming that, if each institution is healthy, 
the system will be healthy.”47 In contrast, “macro-prudential approach to 
prudential regulation rather focuses on the stability of the financial system as a 
whole, and has both a static (cross-sectional) and a dynamic (time varying) 
dimension.”48 
There are overlaps and vagueness in the relationship between the two. Some 
institutions are too important (too big to fail) that they warrant individual 
regulation or supervision as their firm level failure can cause systemic crisis. 
The regulatory approach for these types of actors can be as much macro-
prudential as it is micro. On the contrary, the failure of other financial 
institutions can affect the financial sector only when these institutions fail as a 
herd. In such situations micro-prudential regulation aims to prevent failure from 
happening, and the macro-prudential regulation aims at reducing the economic 
cost of such failure to the sector or the sub-sector as a whole. 
This means that not all financial sector actors warrant the same level of 
prudential supervision. Among financial institutions, it is banks that require the 
highest standard of prudential regulation. This is because, unlike other firms, 
“banks use their liabilities as money, so the purpose of regulation in this case is 
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to ensure that bank‟s assets retain sufficient liquidity to meet any reduction in 
redeposit, and to discourage any reduction in the first place.”49  
When banks lend, they are “betting that the individuals and companies to 
whom they lend capital will earn enough money to pay back their loans” plus 
interest; and the banks in their turn will be able to repay deposits plus interest. 
Eventually, “this process leads to generation of risk and in turn necessitates 
(prudential) regulation.”50 Therefore, the critical role banks play in 
intermediation, liquidity provision, and monitoring and information provision 
means that their failure can lead to systemic crisis and substantial social costs. 
On top of this, the highly interconnected nature and potential exposure to runs 
makes banks particularly vulnerable to any kind of actual or perceived failure.51 
As has been indicated above, besides banks, other financial institutions can 
also be subject to prudential regulation, albeit at different standards. According 
to IBRD/IMF Handbook on Financial Sector Assessment, three attributes of 
financial sector firms must be taken into account for determining the scope of 
prudential regulation: “(a) the difficulty of honoring contractual obligations; (b) 
the difficulty faced by the consumer in assessing the creditworthiness or 
soundness of the institution, and (c) the adversity caused by a breach of 
contractual obligations.”52 Based on these parameters the prevailing view is that 
“financial institutions that do not have deposit-like liabilities to the general 
public do not need to be regulated and supervised as closely as those that do.”53 
The most crucial issue here is whether the business of equipment financing 
justifies prudential regulation. On this point, the prevailing regulatory practice is 
to subject companies that collect “public deposits to prudential regulation 
because of the information asymmetry problems faced by the large number 
depositors in monitoring the use of their deposits. By this rationale, lessors that 
do not obtain public deposits … should not be subject to prudential regulation.”54 
Evidence from the experience of countries, including developed leasing  
markets such as US, UK, and Germany and emerging markets such as South 
Korea and Thailand, show that independent equipment financing companies are 
not subject to any prudential regulation.55 Countries that apply prudential 
regulation to equipment financing companies similar to the one applied to banks 
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do so when the leasing companies are bank affiliated.56 It thus naturally follows 
that in some countries independent leasing companies are not even subjected to 
regulation by banking authorities.57 
From another point of view, it has been suggested that strict prudential 
supervision is necessary for institutions that are systemically important or 
institutions that pose systemic risk. Systemic risk is defined as the “risk that an 
event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in a substantial 
segment of the financial system that is serious enough to have significant 
adverse effects on the real economy with a high probability.”58 It should be 
noted that, “economic shocks become systemic because of the existence of 
spillover effects, whereby there is a contagious loss of confidence that spreads 
throughout the financial system. Thus, the failure of one financial institution, 
even a large one, which does not spread to other institutions and the real 
economy, is not a systemic event.”59 
On the other hand systemically risky institutions are not banks only although 
banks stand out to be the typical ones. To this effect, “systemic risk goes beyond 
the traditional view of single banks vulnerability to depositor runs. At the heart 
of the concept is the notion of contagion, a particularly strong propagation of 
failures from one institution, market or system to another.”60 David Cummins 
and Mary Weiss identify three primary indicators of systemic importance of an 
institution: Namely, size, interconnectedness and lack of substitutability of 
services.61 
Size of an institution refers to not only whether or not it is „too big to fail’ in 
the ordinary sense of size of assets or equity held by a firm, but it also includes 
“the value of derivatives and off-balance sheet (OBS) exposures of the 
institution and the volume of transactions it possesses.”62 Interconnectedness, on 
the other hand, “measures the extent to which financial distress at one or a few 
institutions increases the probability of financial distress at other institutions 
because of the network of financial claims and other interrelation.”63 The third 
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indicator, i.e., substitutability “is defined as the extent to which other institutions 
or segments of the financial system can provide the same services that were 
provided by the failed institution(s).”64 Hence, “in order for lack of 
substitutability to pose a systemic problem the services in question must be of 
critical importance to the functioning of other institutions or the financial 
system” such as the sudden failure of interbank payment or settlement 
systems.65 
However, from the indicators of systemic risk of size, interconnectedness and 
substitutability there is no ground to suggest that financial leasing sector in 
Ethiopia warrants strict prudential supervision. This is so mainly because the 
sector is not affiliated to the banks, with the exception of MFIs which are 
already subject to detailed prudential regulatory requirements. The evidence 
from experience of other countries such as South Korea, Thailand, UK, 
Germany and USA suggests that financial leasing companies not affiliated to 
banks are not subject to prudential supervision.66 It is thus safe to conclude that 
the financial leasing sector should not be subjected to regulatory supervision 
same as that for banks. 
Cumbersome and repressive regulatory regime can retard the growth of the 
equipment leasing sector.67 Such disadvantages include: suppressing  growth of 
the industry by applying unnecessarily stricter prudential standards (for 
example, by preventing entry of firms because of high capital requirements or 
causing inefficient use of funds because of the high levels of reserves required 
and low leverage ratios); impeding the evolution of the sector “from just being a 
simple substitute for loans to a specialized products serving a natural market for 
such services” especially SME clients perceived as high-risk clients.68 Hence, 
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the question is not whether financial leasing should be regulated by institutions 
that regulate banks. The issue is tailoring regulatory standards for non-bank 
financial leasing sector that is distinct from regulations applying to banks. 
Indeed, in most jurisdictions the same institutions that regulate banks also 
regulate financial leasing. This may be because banks are mostly allowed to do 
financial leasing as an alternative product; or it may be due to the fear of 
regulatory arbitrage.69 
2.4.2 Competition and consumer protection regulation  
In addition to prudential regulation, financial sector firms including equipment 
financing businesses may be subjected to non-prudential regulations such as 
competition regulation, consumer protection regulation, and other types of 
regulation. The objectives of these regulatory interventions are diverse such as 
protection of consumers, efficiency enhancement, and other broader social 
objectives such as supporting the growth of a particular sector-SME, export 
sector, manufacturing sector or housing.70 Competition regulation works for the 
benefit of consumers (by optimizing quality and fair price) and for efficiency 
enhancement objectives resulting from the competition. Regulation of lending 
and loan collection practices, loan pricing and lending interest ceilings are 
provided with the objective of consumer protection.71 
However, using financial sector regulations for social policy objectives is not 
free from controversies. Governments are often tempted to exploit financial 
sector regulation to achieve purposes far removed from the objectives of 
preventing systemic risk, or protecting consumers or increasing efficiency in the 
sector. Good examples of such policies include creating regulatory privileges for  
institutions that provide financing for priority sectors such as housing, 
government guarantee schemes for loans given to favored sectors, allowing 
favorable interest rates for financial institutions giving loans to preferred 
sectors, etc.72 Government subsidies for financing to the export sector is also 
another example.73 
However, not all of these regulations necessarily meet their objectives. 
Interest caps on lending for non-bank financial sectors, for example, are aimed 
                                           
69
 Pierre Boyer and Hubert Kempf (2006), „Regulatory Arbitrage and the Efficiency of 
Banking Regulation,‟ CESifo Area Conference on Applied Macroeconomics, Munic 
Based, Globe Spanning Economic Research and Policy Advice Institution, 18-19 March 
2016 <https://www.cesifo-group.de › docs › am16_Gollier › Papers › am16_Boyer> 
(accessed on 10 August 2019). 
 
70
 Fleming and Wiener, supra note 34, p. 3.  
71
 Anne Pouchous, supra note 42, p. 9.  
72
 Id., 11.  
73
 Ibid.  
50                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No.1                             September 2019 
 
 
to avoid abusive interest rates. However, experience from the MFIs shows that 
policy makers are often unable to set an interest rate cap high enough to permit 
development of sustainable MFI sector.74 Likewise, “conduct of business 
regulation serves the objective of protecting clients from harm. Because its 
focus is „client-facing‟, it does not encompass „firm-facing‟ regulations such as 
the imposition of general supervision obligations, record keeping requirements, 
or net capital requirements.”75 
These non-prudential regulations may sometimes overlap and at other times 
contradict with prudential regulation which primarily aims at preventing or 
minimizing systemic risks. On the other hand, researches have shown that a 
number of these regulatory interventions such as “restrictions on product lines, 
are ineffectual at best in safeguarding against systemic risk and may weaken 
regulated institutions by preventing them from meeting the changing needs of 
their customers.”76 Similarly, the „fit and proper test‟ requirement aimed at 
achieving safety and soundness may prove to be an entry barrier contradicting 
the efficiency gains from competition.77 
There can also be overlaps in various types of regulatory mechanisms and 
objectives rendering some of the non-prudential regulations unnecessary in the 
peculiar context of the financial sector. Prudential regulation intended at 
dampening information asymmetry problem that prevents consumers from 
identifying the best institution can minimize the problem through an ex ante fit 
and proper test. Likewise ex post disclosure requirements can achieve the same 
objective by eliminating the information symmetry challenges in favor of 
consumers.78 Thus, if properly applied, these regulatory instruments can 
enhance consumer protection and efficiency enhancement objectives.79 
3. The Regulatory Landscape of Financial Leasing Sector in 
Ethiopia  
This section deals with the regulatory environment of financial leasing in 
Ethiopia. As stated in Section 1, the seven directives issued by the NBE are 
examined in light of five indicators, namely: process/procedural legitimacy, 
internal consistency, consistency with other values, equity/distributional fairness 
(substantive validity) and outcome and impact effectiveness.  
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3.1 Procedural legitimacy  
One of the most prominent mechanisms of ensuring procedural legitimacy of 
regulations is consultation with stakeholders. In the context of business 
regulations, the stakeholders are the businesses which the regulation aims to 
govern. “Consultation with businesses and the public is integral to improving 
the quality of regulation” since regulatory proposals which are “informed by 
public consultation are … more likely to be efficient and effective and less 
prone to the risk of regulatory failure.”80 In addition to enhancing the quality of 
regulations, consultation also promotes transparency and builds trust between 
the regulator and the regulated thereby improving compliance with 
regulations.81 Consultation is also important to assess the potential impact of a 
regulation though regulatory impact analysis which should be done apart from 
consultations. 
So far, the NBE has issued seven directives. namely: Minimum Paid up 
Capital Requirements Directive,82 Requirements for Licensing Directive, 
Manner of Financial and Operational Information Reporting Directive, Capital 
Adequacy Ratio Requirement Directive, Limit of Exposure to a Single Lease 
Directive,83 Operational Modality Directive, and Penalty for Failure to Comply 
with Regulatory Requirements Directive. 
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Two of the directives, i.e., Minimum Capital Directive and Requirement for 
Licensing Directive were issued before any of the equipment leasing companies 
came into existence ruling out any possibility for consultations.84  With regard to 
the other three directives, it is not clear whether or not consultations were made. 
Even if consultations were ever made, it would not be a meaningful exercise as 
all the existing companies are effectively regional government owned or 
controlled policy institutions with no independent business visions apart from 
the government‟s objectives in creating them, which is not in any way different 
from the NBE‟s vision for them. Thus, these directives lack procedural 
legitimacy. 
The right approach to regulatory development is usually to follow rather than 
precede the emergence of the regulated sector. This is because regulatory 
enactments should be gradual and responsive to real problems felt by the sector.  
Experience from the past development of banking and insurance as well as MFI 
regulation shows that detailed regulations were developed gradually as 
responses to practical challenges. This is in line with the legislative intent in the 
respective proclamations (banking, insurance, MFI as well as CGFB) that give 
discretionary power to enact directives when needed, instead of obligation to do 
so ex ante before the emergence of the sector.  
Developing an enabling and conducive environment can be achieved better 
through a sequential and progressive approach than by one-off upfront 
regulation. For instance, the G20 Financial Inclusion Experts group in the 
„Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion‟ issued in June 2010 recommends 
a “test and learn” approach by regulators rather than regulating in advance of 
market conditions.85 Therefore: 
„instead of attempting to foresee all possible business models and issue 
corresponding regulatory measures, regulators should set requirements in a 
flexible and open manner that can encompass different models in a single 
range of rules and elaborate as needed further on, rather than inhibiting the 
development of new products from the outset.‟86  
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3.2 Internal consistency  
A good regulatory system should be internally consistent in the sense that 
derivative legislation should not contradict with the parent laws. It should also 
make a clear demarcation of regulatory power among regulatory institutions 
whenever more than one oversight body is empowered to regulate a given 
sector. Proclamation No. 807/2013 vests primary regulatory power over 
financial leasing companies to the NBE. However, the same Proclamation also 
recognizes the regulatory jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade (MOT).  
In this regard, what is provided in Article 4, Paragraph 6, Sub-paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the Proclamation seem self-contradictory. Sub-paragraph 4 states that 
“the National Bank of Ethiopia may issue directives that enable it to regulate 
and supervise the business of capital goods finance in accordance with this 
Proclamation.” Then, sub-paragraph 5 provides that “without prejudice to the 
provision of sub article (4) of this Article, the Ministry may issue other 
directives necessary for the implementation of this Proclamation.” These 
provisions do not unequivocally demarcate the division of directive making 
power between NBE and MOT.  
However, a closer scrutiny of the wording of the provision that defines 
NBE‟s regulatory power may shed some light on the matter. Article 4(4) of the 
Proclamation provides an exhaustive list of powers to the NBE to issue 
directives in respect of the following matters:  (a) criteria to be fulfilled to obtain 
capital goods finance business license; (b) fitness and qualification criteria to be 
fulfilled by directors and a chief executive officer of a company engaged in 
capital goods finance business; (c) the amount of capital and reserves to be 
maintained by a company engaged in capital goods finance business; and (d) 
provisioning for doubtful accounts and depreciation of fixed assets.87 One of the 
established cannons of legal interpretation is that “the expression of one thing 
implies the exclusion of the other (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).”88 If 
Proclamation No. 807/2013 mentions the four subject matters, and no others; 
NBE can issue directives only on these four subject matters; and not on other 
matters.  
However, the Proclamation bestows the NBE with further supervisory 
powers, but not directive making power. To this effect, Article 4(5) of the 
Proclamation stipulates that “to ensure adequacy of risk management, safety and 
soundness of capital goods finance business company, NBE may (a) instruct the 
company to submit periodic reports; (b) examine or cause the examination of the 
                                           
87
 Capital Goods Leasing Business (Amendment) Proclamation No. 807/2013, Article 4(4) 
88
 Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner (2012), Reading Law: The Interpretation of Statutory 
Texts,  (St. Paul MN: Thompson West, p. 69. 
54                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No.1                             September 2019 
 
 
company onsite with or without prior notice; (c) suspend or dismiss one or more 
directors or the chief executive officer of the company; and (d) take any other 
appropriate corrective measure.” This provision implies that NBE can apply 
micro-prudential regulatory approaches.  
From what is provided in Article 4(4) of Proclamation No. 807/2013, no 
valid legal basis exists for directives on (1) Manner of Financial and Operational 
Information Reporting, (2) Limit to Exposure to a Single Lease, (3) Operational 
Modality Directive and (4) Penalty for Failure to Comply with Regulatory 
Requirements.  
The clauses of these directives do not invoke Article 4(4) of Proclamation 
No. 807/2013 as the source of power for their issuance. This makes a 
remarkable contrast to the directives on Minimum Paid up Capital 
Requirements, Requirements for Licensing, and Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Requirement, which refer to Article 4(4) as the source of NBE‟s power. If so, on 
which provisions of the Proclamation do these directives purport to be based? 
For example, both the Directive on Limit to Exposure to a Single Lease and the 
Operational Modality Directive refer to Article 18(4) of the Proclamation. And 
the Directive on Penalty for Failure to Comply with Regulatory Requirements 
recites Articles 4(5)(d) and 18(4). Likewise, the Directive on Manner of 
Financial and Operational Information Reporting recites Article 4(4), 4(5)(a) 
and 18(4). But none of these provisions empower NBE to issue directives on 
these subjects. 
After listing the subject matters on which the NBE can issue directives, the 
Proclamation lists other subjects on which NBE can do occasional or ad-hoc 
supervision. Those subjects for occasional supervision are submission of reports, 
onsite examination of the company, suspending or dismissing one or more 
directors or the chief executive officer of the company; and taking other 
appropriate corrective measure (a power rather vague). From the wordings of 
the provision these matters are not areas on which NBE can enact directives, 
because had it been so, the Proclamation would not have provided a separate list 
of matters in Article 4(4) and 4(5).  
On the other hand, it is logical to read Sub-Articles 4 and 5 of Article 4 
harmoniously because “the provisions of a legal text should be interpreted in a 
way that renders them compatible, not contradictory with each other.”89 Hence, 
the powers given to the NBE under Article 4(5) to instruct a company are 
directly related to monitoring compliance with the directives the NBE is 
empowered to issue under 4(4). For instance, the power to instruct submission 
of periodic reports under 4(5)(a) or the power to examine the company onsite 
under 4(5)(b) seems to link well with compliance with the directives on capital 
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and reserves under 4(4)(c), and directive on provisioning for doubtful accounts 
and depreciation of assets under 4(4)(c). On the other hand, the power to 
suspend or dismiss one or more of the directors and CEO under Article 4(5)(c) 
logically follows from the fitness and qualification criteria directive issued 
under Article 4(4)(b) specifically or the licensing directive under 4(4)(a) 
generally. Hence, there is no directive making power for NBE under Article 4(5) 
of the amended proclamation.  
Regarding Article 18(4) of the Proclamation, it is important to read it 
together with the other provisions of the Proclamation. In the first place, Article 
18 is entirely concerned with distributing regulatory mandate to the Council of 
Ministers, the Ministry of Trade and NBE that are executive organs. Hence, 
having dealt with the powers of Council of Ministers and MOT in Article 18(1-
3), the Article 18(4) of the Proclamation stipulates that “the National Bank may 
issue directives that enable it to regulate and supervise the business of capital 
goods finance in accordance with this Proclamation.” Here, it can be inferred 
that the phrase “…in accordance with this Proclamation” refers to the list of 
matters under Article 4(4).  Had the legislator intended to give NBE a regulatory 
carte-blanche under Article 18, there would be no point in providing Article 
4(4) and stipulating distinct wording in Article 4(5). Again, the harmonious 
legal interpretation rule helps us here.  
The scope of NBE‟s regulatory power over financial leasing sector can also 
be viewed by comparing the CGFB Proclamation with the Banking 
Proclamation and Insurance Proclamation. If one makes such a comparison the 
law maker‟s intention to limit NBE‟s power with regard to financial leasing 
companies becomes manifest. Even though there is only little resemblance 
between the powers given to the NBE in banking and insurance proclamations, 
and the list of powers in Proclamation No. 807, the NBE seems to reproduce the 
directives from these other sectors. Reproducing directives applicable for other 
financial sectors to equipment financing sectors- directives which are not 
envisaged in the enabling proclamation- makes the directives lack legitimacy.90 
In an interview for Birritu Magazine –a periodical publication of the NBE–, the 
director in charge of overseeing equipment leasing sector stated that the 
supervision of lease financing companies “would be based on prudential 
regulations that help ensure the stability and soundness of the financial 
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institutions in general and leasing sector in particular”91 implying that 
equipment financing sector is treated in the same way as banks. 
Therefore, by enacting directives on (1) Manner of Financial and Operational 
Information Reporting, (2) Limit to Exposure to a Single Lease, (3) Operational 
Modality Directive and (4) Penalty for Failure to Comply with Regulatory 
Requirements, the NBE has overstepped its regulatory boundary set by 
Proclamation. Hence, the regulatory regime administered by the NBE is 
inconsistent with the Proclamation.  
3.3 Consistency with other values 
A good business regulatory system should be consistent with other economic 
sector regulations or values. At best, it should indirectly promote these values; 
or at least it should not contradict and defeat the realization of such values. 
Business sector regulations are naturally expected to be consistent with 
competition and consumer protection principles.92  
In relation to competition regulation, the financial leasing sector in Ethiopia 
is rather characterized by unevenness. The Minimum Paid up Capital Directive 
categorizes financial leasing companies into those targeting micro enterprises, 
and those targeting SME sector. The minimum capital required for the 
companies targeting the former is Birr 200 (two hundred) million and for those 
targeting the latter is Birr 400 (four hundred) million. According to Article 4(3) 
of the Directive, the above minimum capital requirement does not apply to 
equipment leasing companies established by regional governments and/or city 
governments. The intention here is to exclude the big five leasing companies 
controlled by four regional states and Addis Ababa City Administration.93 In a 
similar fashion, the Directive on Lessor‟s Exposure Limitation to a Single Lease 
does not apply to the „big five‟ companies creating a favorable playing field for 
these actors in comparison to their potential private sector competitors.94 
Operational Modality Directive introduced in 2019 creates restriction for 
foreign leasing companies in relation to borrowing from domestic banks. Article 
6 paragraph 1 states that “a foreign company shall not borrow funds from the 
domestic financial system in any manner.” However, all of the five CGFB 
companies owned or controlled by regional governments have been heavily 
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borrowing from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia.95 Hence, regardless of the 
rationale behind the restriction, its mere existence undoubtedly creates an 
uneven competition landscape in the sector. As cost of capital is an important 
factor for the success of equipment financing enterprises, such unequal 
treatment can render the playing field rather uneven.      
Each of these five CGFB companies is controlled by the four big regional 
states and Addis Ababa City Administration following the experience of the five 
big microfinance companies.96 Accordingly, Addis CGFB serves the market in 
Addis Ababa, Oromia CGFB serves the market in Oromia region, Kaza CGFB, 
Walya CGFB and Debub CGFB companies serve respectively the markets in 
Tigray, Amhara and SNNP regions.97 This further limits competition in the 
sector, and prevents the benefits that would have trickled down towards the 
consumers as a result of competition. Moreover, the prohibitively high 
minimum capital threshold for new entrants at 200 million and 400 million, can 
be a barrier to the entry of new businesses thereby entrenching the 
uncompetitive market. In a survey conducted by one study in Ethiopia, “a 
significant number of the respondents (73.8%) perceives that the minimum paid-
up capital is set to be high which may be a barrier for new entrants from the 
private sector.”98 
3.4 Equity/ distributional fairness  
As discussed above, Proclamation No. 807/2013 empowers the NBE to apply 
prudential regulation on financial leasing sector. NBE‟s regulatory approach for 
equipment financing sector comprises both micro and macro prudential 
regulations. The Proclamation‟s list of powers given to the NBE in respect of 
financial leasing companies seems rather arbitrary than a result of a careful 
assessment of the nature of the sector and the risks it poses on to the economy. 
For instance, the powers given to NBE under Article 4(5)(c) of the 
Proclamation “to suspend or dismiss one or more directors or the chief executive 
officer of the company” appears to be unjustified in light of the systemic 
unimportance of a given leasing company at the micro level. The supervisory 
power of the NBE under this Proclamation is much more unfettered than even 
compared to the case for banks and insurances.  
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A similar provision in the Banking Business Proclamation No. 592/2008, 
Article 17(1) provides that „the National Bank may, for sufficient cause, 
suspend or remove a director, a chief executive officer or a senior executive 
officer of a bank. Sub-Article 2 of the same provision provides: 
 “for the purpose of sub-article (1) of this Article, „sufficient cause‟ shall 
include the following: a) failure to comply with the provisions of Article 15 
and 16 of this Proclamation; b) any action detrimental, in the opinion of the 
National Bank, to the stability or soundness of the financial sector, the 
economy or the general public interest carried out by a director, a chief 
executive officer or a senior executive officer a bank.” 
The Banking Business Proclamation does not only require good cause, but 
also clarifies the constituent elements of good cause. These good cause 
requirements are directly and indirectly related to financial health of the banking 
industry in which mismanagement at an individual firm level can threaten the 
overall sector and indirectly the wider economy. However, we do not find such 
good cause requirement in the financial leasing proclamation. Unlike the 
banking sector, equipment financing sector apparently poses by far lesser 
systemic risk to its own sub-sector or to the wider financial sector, and it does 
not pose significant risk to the overall economy. Thus the provision of such 
intrusive prudential requirement is ill-designed. 
Likewise, the power given to NBE under paragraphs 4(5) “(a) to instruct the 
company to submit periodic reports; (b) to examine or cause the examination of 
the company onsite with or without prior notice; and (d) to take any other 
appropriate corrective measure” can also be questioned. The micro-prudential 
approach of regulation intended in these provisions is uncalled for, both by the 
nature of equipment financing business and the reality of the industry in 
Ethiopia.  Equipment leasing companies in Ethiopia do not seem to warrant the 
type of prudential regulation envisaged in the Proclamation as the sector is at an 
infant stage of development.  
Another instance of poorly designed requirement in the Proclamation relates 
to portfolio restriction. The Proclamation unnecessarily prohibits financial 
leasing companies from including in their portfolio operating lease.99 
Restrictions on product or service lines should be placed only when 
circumstances clearly justify. Such restriction would have been justified if banks 
were allowed to enter the equipment financing sector since the justification in 
such circumstances would be protection of public deposit. If the reason is that 
MFIs that collect public deposits are allowed to do financial leasing, the scope 
of the restriction should have been limited to these. The restriction can on the 
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other hand result in defeating the very prudential objectives the regulatory 
architecture was designed to achieve. This is because the requirement can force 
financial leasing companies to accumulate a significant portion of dead assets 
when they repossess their equipment following lessees‟ default. If these 
companies are not allowed to do operating lease businesses, the accumulation of 
assets repossessed after a significant portion of the contract life has elapsed, can 
weaken a leasing company.    
Even though some of these directives emanate from valid legal authority 
given to NBE by Proclamation No. 807, this does not preclude the need for the 
examination of fairness of the Proclamation itself or each of the directives 
emanating from it. For instance, if one looks at the Licensing Directive, it is 
surprising to see how minor matters are controlled by the NBE; such as age, 
training, reputation etc of project manager, CEO, board of directors, time limit 
for CEO to stay as an acting CEO, criteria to be a board chairperson, 
requirements for pre-application and application phases and the numerous 
documentary requirements, etc. In fact, the licensing directive is very similar in 
its content, structure and organization with the Directive for Licensing of 
Banking Business SBB/56/2013.  
Likewise, the Directive on Limit of Exposure to a Single Lease 
(CGFB/09/2019) prescribes the maximum permissible size of the lease 
contracts. The explanations appear to be two. On the one hand is the desire to 
prevent a leasing company from serving few big lease applications100 thereby 
depleting financing for smaller ones. On the other hand, it is meant to limit the 
effects from the failure of a single lessee towards the lessor by diversifying 
default risks.101 But such interference in distributional decision making by 
private companies seems to be rather farfetched and unreasonable. All these 
regulations do not seem to serve any valid regulatory purpose in the context of 
independent or captive companies.  
It is not clear what ground the NBE has to so tightly regulate the use of the 
capital of companies that are privately financed and operated. Paradoxically, this 
particular directive excludes the applicability of the exposure limitation 
provision to the five big regional state controlled leasing companies that are 
either wholly or predominantly financed by public funds. Indeed, if at all such a 
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restriction is needed, it should have been applied to the ones that manage tax 
payers‟ money; not on private companies.  
Moreover, the Operational Modality Directive has introduced compulsory 
target market for financial leasing companies established with 400 million Birr 
capital.102 Accordingly, a company that is established by meeting the 400 
million Birr minimum capital “shall primarily focus and provide its capital 
goods finance service” to SMEs and manufacturing sectors. Hence, a minimum 
of 60% and 65% of the leasing portfolio of such companies shall at any time 
constitute finance provided to SMEs, and manufacturing sector businesses 
respectively. In spite of the benign motive the directive emanates from, it seems 
unjust to burden a private business with such heavy and onerous imposition. The 
requirement also seems to be incongruent with prudential regulatory objectives 
which can be better served by portfolio diversification along various sectors. 
3.5 Outcome and Impact effectiveness  
Economic/business regulations are introduced with the view to achieving a 
defined set of objectives. In this regard, the capital goods financing business 
proclamation and the consequent regulatory regime were created with a big 
developmental objective. For instance, Ethiopia‟s Second Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP-II) “considers the equipment financing sector as a 
potential resource to boost employment, increase production of import substitute 
in goods, and accelerate a transition from agricultural led to industry led 
economy.”103 On the other hand, the original Capital Goods Lease Proclamation 
103/1998 stipulates as its objectives the creation of alternative sources of 
financing for those investors who have the desire, knowledge and profession to 
start businesses and lack the necessary capital. Proclamation 807/2013 does not, 
however, have a clear statement of objectives presumably because it is based on 
the objectives in the original proclamation as it is an amendment. Here, it is wise 
to distinguish between medium term outcomes and long term developmental 
impacts. The creation of alternative sources of financing is a medium term 
outcome, whereas what is stated in the GTP is a longer term developmental 
impact.  
It is only six years since the new regulatory framework for equipment 
financing sector has been in place; and it may be too early to speak of 
developmental impacts in terms of contribution of the sector for employment 
generation, import substitution or for progress away from agriculture led 
economy to industry led one. Even if it were time to make such evaluations, this 
research does not claim to be well equipped to embark on developmental impact 
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analysis. However, it would not require one to be genius to predict about long 
term impacts from the outputs and outcomes of the existing regulatory regime.  
If we liken the overall regulatory exercise with a particular project intervention, 
we can identify the creation of equipment financing enterprises and supply of 
services as outcome and contribution to job creation and economic development 
as impact.  
In relation to the outcomes, creation of equipment financing enterprises and 
supply of services which the Proclamation envisages have not been met. With 
the exception of the five equipment financing companies created by the four 
regional states and the City Administration of Addis Ababa104, only one private 
sector equipment financing entity has been licensed in the second half of 
2019.105 If these state owned equipment financing companies operated 
independently from political interference based on market principles and 
international best practices they would have improved access to finance to some 
extent.106  
However, the creation of a robust equipment financing sector cannot be 
realized without the emergence of a sufficient number of private sector firms 
that operate the business of equipment financing for profit making purposes. 
That requires an enabling regulatory environment conducive for a sustainable 
equipment financing sector. To the extent that the regulatory regime 
administered by the NBE has been unable to motivate the private sector, one can 
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only say that it has not produced the expected outcomes. Without the right 
outcomes, it cannot lead to a positive impact envisioned by the government. To 
achieve the positive outcome and developmental impacts, it is necessary to go 
back and revise the Proclamation and the directives.  
Conclusion and the Way Forward towards Reform   
There is an enormous market potential for growth of financial leasing sector in 
Ethiopia.  There can be hundreds of thousands of youth with skills and good 
projects without the required capital to start up businesses.  The equipment 
financing legal regime was created to stimulate the expansion of leasing firms 
that will enable start ups and SMEs which cannot be served by the traditional 
banking sector. For this potential to materialize, an appropriate enabling 
regulatory regime should be put in place.  
On the contrary, the current regulatory environment, as discussed in this 
article, has created challenges rather than opportunities to achieve that purpose. 
While the typology of leasing firms envisaged in Ethiopia are either 
independents or captives of equipment manufacturers, this characteristics does 
not seem to feature in the regulatory instruments designed so far. A cursory 
view of the regulatory directives and standards developed by the NBE would 
compel one to think that these are designed for regulation of banks or bank 
owned leasing firms.  
Some of these directives do not have a valid legal basis for the NBE to enact 
them in the first place. Some of the NBE directives seem to be rather repressive 
in the sense that they unnecessarily inhibit private autonomy, innovation and 
efficiency. The Operational Modality Directive for instance goes against the 
central tenets of prudential regulation by requiring high concentration of 
portfolio to the manufacturing sector (65%) contrary to conventional wisdom of 
portfolio diversification. This calls for overhauling the entire regulatory 
framework. Specifically, the directives that have no legal basis, i.e., the 
directives on (i) the Manner of Financial and Operational Information 
Reporting, (ii) Limit to Exposure to a Single Lease, (iii) Operational Modality 
and (iv) Penalty for Failure to Comply with Regulatory Requirements should be 
repealed. Moreover, the restrictions on product lines and restriction of market 
segment (such as Micro or SME only) should be abandoned.                              ■   
 
                                                                                                         
 
